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In this issue of Atlantisch Perspectief, Roberta N. Haar wrote an article entitled “Will China replace the U.S. as the 
world’s predominant power?” Among other things, the article examines the scholarly discussion about a rising pow-
er’s ambition to challenge a declining great power. The power-transition theory, proposed by A. F. K Organski in 1958, 
argues that a rising power would challenge a dominant power, especially if the former is dissatisfied with the status 
quo.1 In light of the Chinese challenges to the US, Haar argues that COVID-19 may ultimately reduce Chinese power 
on the world stage, rather than enhance its influence in the world.
This article attempts to approach Sino-US relations from 
a Chinese foreign policy perspective. I will first discuss 
one of the main sources of Chinese assertiveness in its 
current foreign policy strategy and the implications for its 
behavior. Next, I will elaborate on the latest diplomatic 
tensions between China and US, the role of Hong Kong 
as the main theater of the new Cold War, and how COV-
ID-19 could be a game-changer for Chinese ascendance 
and US declinism. I will conclude by suggesting strategies 
China could adopt in times of a global COVID-19 outbreak 
and the possible “decoupling” of Sino-US relations.
AMBITIOUS RISING POWER, NO MORE “LAY LOW”
China is a rising power. Since China began to open up 
and reform its economy in 1978, GDP growth has av-
eraged almost 10 percent a year, and more than 850 
million people have been lifted out of absolute pover-
ty. China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest 
economy in 2010. It has since remained in that position, 
second only to the US.
Furthermore, China is an ambitious power. The source of 
its rising power ambition could be traced back even be-
fore 2010. In May 2002, China’s President and General 
Secretary of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Jiang Zemin 
put forth the notion of “an important period of strategic 
opportunities” (zhongyao zhanlue jiyu qi) in his speech at 
the Party School. The 16th Party Congress subsequently 
adopted this notion in a keynote Party document, stating, 
“For our country, the first two decades of the twenty-first 
century are an important period of strategic opportuni-
ties, which we must seize tightly, and which offers bright 
prospects.”2 
The idea of “twenty years” of strategic opportunities is 
built upon three essential achievements in the Jiang 
administration (1993-2002): (1) the peaceful reunifica-
tion of Hong Kong and Macau with China in 1997 and 
1999, respectively; (2) the ability to sustain a steady 
GDP growth performance of 8.8 percent in 1997 and 7.8 
percent in 1998 while its neighboring countries were un-
dergoing severe financial meltdown during the 1997/98 
Asian Financial Crisis;3 (3) the accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 supported by the Clin-
ton administration as part of the US engagement policy 
with China.   
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China has, however, not openly challenged the power sta-
tus quo. The country has adhered to a “lay low” foreign 
policy strategy since 1990. The strategy is summarized 
in eight Chinese characters (i.e., tao guang yang hui, you 
suo zou wei). The widely adopted English translation of 
the eight-character strategy would be “keep a low profile, 
accomplish something.” First proposed by Deng Xiaoping 
(1978-1993) in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square Incident, the strategy highlighted the fact that 
China as a developing country should concentrate on its 
economic development (i.e., accomplish something) and 
that China should never seek hegemony or leadership. In 
other words, China wanted to make its rise as quiet and 
non-provocative as possible (i.e., keep a low profile).  
Chinese recent assertiveness is attributed mainly to the 
changing course of its foreign policy strategy. After Xi be-
came the CCP General Secretary in November 2012 and 
the President of China in March 2013, he ditched the 
keep-a-low-profile part and went directly to the second 
half of the strategy: accomplish something. 
Fulfilling the Chinese Dream is what Xi would like to ac-
complish.4 The Chinese Dream entails the great rejuve-
nation of the Chinese nation. The great rejuvenation is 
realized via the attainment of “Two Centenary Goals”: 
the economic targets of China becoming a “moderately 
prosperous (xiaokang) society in China by around 2021, 
the 100th anniversary of the CCP, and the moderniza-
tion of target of China becoming a completely developed 
country by around 2049, the 100th anniversary of the 
PRC.”5 To make the Dream come true, Xi has announced 
a significant number of economic and trade initiatives 
since 2013, including the development of the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road,” a scheme that was later dubbed “Belt and Road 
Initiatives.”
The second centenary goal is also about national sover-
eignty and the territorial integrity of the country. The last 
imperial dynasty of China was forced to sign “unequal 
treaties” and divided into different spheres of influence 
by European and Japanese colonial powers after the end 
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China’s foreign policy strategy highlighted the fact that China as a developing country should concentrate on its economic develop-
ment (i.e., accomplish something) and that China should never seek hegemony or leadership. This changed after President Xi took office (photo: Flickr/Michael Mandiberg)
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of the Opium Wars. Hong Kong and Macau were two of 
the “lost territories” in the century of humiliation. Un-
der the One Country Two Systems (IC2S), for 50 years 
after the reunification, both cities enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy, political rights, and freedom unavailable in 
other parts of China. Since the IC2S will expire in 2047 
in Hong Kong and 2049 in Macau, observers believe that 
2049 would be the deadline for the CCP to take back 
Taiwan, either peacefully or otherwise.
COVID-19 AS A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY
Will China achieve great rejuvenation by 2049? Last year 
China celebrated its 70th birthday. One-party govern-
ments nevertheless have rarely survived longer than 70 
years; the political regime could fall apart because of a 
big crisis. Some commenters and observers predict that 
the ongoing COVID-19 turmoil could be the “ultimate” 
cause of the collapse of the one-party regime. In the ab-
sence of the ideological and political-electoral legitimacy 
pillars, economic performance has been the key pillar le-
gitimatizing one-party rule in China. Considering the slow-
down of economic growth since 2014, and the financial 
repercussions of the Sino-US Trade War since 2018, the 
ongoing COVID-19 crisis could further erode its perform-
ative legitimacy. 
On the 20th of January, Xi gave “important directions” 
for responding to the coronavirus. It was the first public 
speech Xi had made since the first reported cases in 
China in December 2019.6 The aggressive and some-
what draconian measures in disease control follow-
ing Xi’s speech have been impressive. One well-known 
measure was the lockdown of the epicenter Wuhan and 
its neighboring cities on the 23rd of January. The scale 
of lockdown, in terms of the number of people being 
quarantined (i.e., around 20 million in three cities), was 
unprecedented in human history. Apart from the three 
cities, many residential districts and housing estates in 
other Chinese cities underwent semi-lockdowns, or “en-
closed management” in Chinese terms.
Another outstanding measure is that the Chinese author-
ities managed to build two new hospitals in Wuhan in 10 
days. These two hospitals could admit and treat around 
2,000 patients. Another 16 makeshift hospitals were 
also set up in Wuhan to admit patients with mild symp-
toms. That the Chinese government constructed a hospi-
tal in 7 days on the outskirts of Beijing during the 2003 
SARS outbreak provides a model for the current govern-
ment in its response to the new epidemic 17 years later. 
While COVID-19 is still raging worldwide, in the opening 
session of the National Party Congress on the 22nd of 
May, Premier Li Keqiang confidently stated that China 
had pulled out of the pandemic crisis faster and in better 
shape than much of the world because of the “hard work 
and sacrifice of our [the] entire nation.”7 
Seizing the “period of strategic opportunities” amid COV-
ID-19, the Chinese leadership announced the controver-
sial National Security Law for Hong Kong at the Congress. 
The move evidently accelerates the Xi’s vision of a “great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” for the legislation 
aimed at stamping out any acts or activities that endan-
ger Chinese national security. In the eyes of Beijing, the 
anti-extradition-bill protests that have disrupted the city 
for the past year are a prelude to separatism, subversion, 
and terrorism. The government claims that the activities 
have been covertly plotted by foreign forces to prevent 
China from rising and rejuvenating. Xi’s decision to im-
pose security legislation on Hong Kong directly rather 
than by working through the territory’s local legislature 
nevertheless would result in a “one country, one system” 
in Hong Kong.
HONG KONG AND THE NEW COLD WAR
One could understand that the aim of the implementa-
tion of National Security Law in Hong Kong is to defend 
China’s national interests of national sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity. As such, Chinese moves might not fit 
the “power transition” scenario of being a dissatisfied 
challenger to the established, aging hegemon. This line 
of argument nevertheless misses the point that the per-
ception of the US regarding Chinese actions equally de-
termines the process of the power transition. 
Hong Kong is the main theater of the new Cold War. Hong 
Kong has experienced a social movement since June 
2019. The demonstrations oppose the government-pro-
posed extradition bill that could send Hong Kong peo-
ple to Mainland China for trials. Hong Kong people are 
afraid that they would not receive fair trials in Mainland 
China, and they see the proposed bill as a means for 
Beijing to arrest political dissidents. A series of protests 
began in June 2019, with two million people marching 
on the street on one occasion (i.e., around one-third of 
Hong Kong’s population) to protest the extradition bill. 
The Hong Kong government’s refusal to investigate police 
brutality during the mass protests has kept the momen-
tum of the social movement going, even though the bill 
was withdrawn in September 2019. Hong Kong observ-
ers and commentators believe that the present National 
Security Law is simply the 2.0 version of the 2019 extra-
dition bill. Still, the former is more stringent because the 
Law allows Chinese intelligence agencies to set up their 
bases and enforce law directly in the city. 
The extradition bill is viewed as an ideological threat to 
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Fulfilling the Chinese Dream is what Xi would like to accomplish.  The Chinese Dream entails the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This means, for example, striving for 
a moderately prosperous (xiaokang) society in China by 2021. Pictured here is Wangfujing Street in Beijing (photo: Vitaly Kyrychuk/Shutterstock.com)
the US. More importantly, the Hong Kong protests have 
been utilized by the US to increase its bargaining power 
with China. Three weeks before the signing of Phase I 
of the trade deal, the US government passed the Hong 
Kong Democracy and Human Rights Bill in December 
2019—Washington could punish Hong Kong and Chi-
nese officials violating human rights in Hong Kong. 
The National Security Law is also perceived as an eco-
nomic as well as ideological threat by the West. A joint 
statement by the US, Canada, Australia, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, released on the 28th of May, denounced 
the National Security Law, stating that the proposal is in 
“direct conflict” with China’s promises in 1997 when it 
regained sovereignty over the former British colony.8 The 
US has also launched an aggressive separate reaction to 
the National Security Law. On the 27th of May, one day 
before the final approval of the plan, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo announced that Hong Kong no longer en-
joys a “high degree of autonomy” from China. He further 
claimed, “No reasonable person can assert today that 
Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from 
China, given facts on the ground.”9 
Pompeo’s announcement is predictable since it is not the 
first time that the US has played the Hong Kong card on 
China. The US has long been an observer of the situation 
in Hong Kong. Before the 1997 handover, the US Con-
gress enacted the US-HK Policy Act, which stipulates that 
the US would continue to treat Hong Kong as a separate 
territory in trade and economic matters. When the pro-
test started in June 2019, the US had already raised the 
issue of canceling the US-HK Policy Act and even threat-
ened to revoke the WTO membership of Hong Kong. 
The current US plan of removing Hong Kong’s special priv-
ileges sends a strong warning signal to China, while pro-
testers in the territory warmly welcome the US decision. 
Protesters believe that the withdrawal of the US-HK Policy 
Act could further erode the performative legitimacy pil-
lar of China because China relies on this global financial 
hub for transactions with other countries. Many Chinese 
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Without a special status, the city is no longer an independent economic entity that can attract foreign capital, and its trade and financial system could collapse. Protestors 
clearly understand all the possible economic repercussions of the city’s economy. They nevertheless believe that US involvement and international pressure could be a way to 
change the mind of the Chinese leadership (photo: Jimmy Shiu/Shutterstock.com)
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and foreign firms use Hong Kong as an international or 
regional base, and members of elite Communist Party 
families do business and own property there—the impor-
tance of Hong Kong to China’s economic development 
has been barely discussed in state-run media.10 
Without a special status, the city is no longer an inde-
pendent economic entity that can attract foreign capital, 
and its trade and financial system could collapse. Hong 
Kong could eventually become just another Chinese city. 
Protestors clearly understand all the possible economic 
repercussions of the city’s economy. They nevertheless 
believe that US involvement and international pressure 
could be a way to change the mind of the Chinese lead-
ership. The mentality of Hong Kong protestors is best 
captured with a quote from The Hunger Games movie, “If 
we burn, then you burn with us.”
A MISJUDGMENT OF THE US DECLINISM
In the eyes of Chinese leaders, US declinism looked 
likely in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 
2008/09, when China became a key holder of US debt. 
Hints of US declinism are even more visible in the Trump 
administration. The rise of American trade protectionism, 
isolationism, and the retreat from major international 
agreements and obligations, including the Trans-Pacif-
ic Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement on climate 
change, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Trea-
ty, UN Human Rights Council, together with the threat-
ened-to-withdraw proposals from WTO and WHO all verify 
the decline of the US. Trump’s indecisive responses to 
the early outbreak of COVID-19 on American soil as well 
as the recent nationwide George Floyd demonstrations 
add new evidence of  US declinism.  
Washington is in decline; however, the rate of decline is 
not as fast as Beijing would like to see. Despite an out-
standing growth in economic and military power in Chi-
na, the US outperforms its Chinese counterpart in both 
areas. The US likewise outcompetes China in alliance 
building in Asia. In addition, John Ikenberry, a renowned 
Professor in international relations and American foreign 
policy at Princeton University, argues that although Amer-
ica’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal 
international order is likely to persist, even in the Trump 
administration. In Ikenberry’s words, “the stability and 
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persistence of the existing international order do not de-
pend on the concentration of American power.”11 
NEVER FORGET WHY YOU STARTED
The hard work and sacrifice of the entire nation in curbing 
the global spread of COVID-19 comes at an enormous 
price. The economic and political repercussions are un-
imaginable. The global supply chain has been disrupted 
due to complete and semi-lockdowns in various industrial 
provinces of China. The manufacturing purchasing man-
agers’ index (PMI), a critical indicator of China’s manufac-
turing activity, registered 40.3 in February, which was the 
lowest in history, even though the latest figure released 
in early June rebounded to the baseline (i.e., 50).12 
The Chinese government did not set a target for economic 
growth during the recent National Congress, which would 
imply that the authorities are more cautious about the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 impact on global economies, 
plus the possibility of a second wave of COVID-19 in the 
country. Besides, the Chinese authorities have suffered 
a significant loss in diplomacy in their failure to curb the 
outbreak of the disease and their delayed responses. 
Setbacks of the Belt and Road Initiatives in several coun-
tries, including the cancellation of agreements between 
Chinese companies and Port Darwin in Australia, the Port 
of Haifa in Israel, and the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, 
are among the many examples of diplomatic backlash 
due to the global COVID-19 outbreak.
It is wrong to believe that rising states, such as China, 
always have to challenge the existing great powers. Josh-
ua Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International 
Relations at Boston University, proposes four strategies 
rising states could pursue toward declining states: (1) 
relegation strategy—push declining states down or from 
the great power ranks using all means at a rising state’s 
disposal and expense; (2) strengthening strategy—sup-
port a decliner and keep it as a member of the great pow-
er club even at high cost and risk to rising states them-
selves; (3) weakening strategy—ad hoc and cautious 
gambits to whittle away at a declining state’s strength 
over time while trying to avoid an open competition with 
the decliner that the riser may not win; (4) bolstering 
strategy—ad hoc and low-cost efforts to keep a decliner 
a great power.13
The ultimate aim of its foreign policy, indeed of all Chi-
nese policies, is to keep the CCP in power. Without the 
pillars of ideological and electoral legitimacy, perform-
ative and nationalist legitimacy would be the two main 
pillars legitimizing CCP rule. However, the performative 
pillar is “shaking” owing to the slowdown of economic 
growth, which has been worsened by the global COVID-19 
crisis. Beijing has to rely more on nationalist legitimacy. 
This explains the recent aggressions of China in the Tai-
wan Strait, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, and the 
worsening relations with the US. As a perpetual one-party 
regime, it would be wiser for China to adopt the weak-
ening strategy that avoids an open competition with the 
US. Drawing on Xi’s favorite motto: Don’t forget the origi-
nal intention (i.e., buwang chuxin, laoji shiming), perhaps 
China needs to shift its foreign policy into the first half 
of the eight-character strategy-- keeping a low profile, as 
previous Chinese leaders maintained. 
Catherine Yuk-ping Lo who was born and raised in Hong Kong is a 
postdoctoral teaching fellow at Maastricht University. She specializes in 
international relations and health security.
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